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Abstract Shear-based deformation processing by hybrid cutting-extrusion and free machining are used to make continuous strip, of thickness up to 1 mm, from low-workability AA6013-T6 in a single deformation step. The intense shear can impose effective strains as large as 2 in the strip without pre-heating of the workpiece. The creation of strip in a single step is facilitated by three factors inherent to the cutting deformation zone: highly confined shear deformation, in situ plastic deformation-induced heating, and high hydrostatic pressure. The hybrid cutting-extrusion, which employs a second die located across from the primary cutting tool to constrain the chip geometry, is found to produce strip with smooth surfaces (Sa < 0.4 μm) that is similar to cold-rolled strip. The strips show an elongated grain microstructure that is inclined to the strip surfaces—a shear texture—that is quite different from rolled sheet. This shear texture (inclination) angle is determined by the deformation path. Through control of the deformation parameters such as strain and temperature, a range of microstructures and strengths could be achieved in the strip. When the cutting-based deformation was done at room temperature, without workpiece preheating, the starting T6 material was further strengthened by as much as 30% in a single step. In elevated-temperature cutting-extrusion, dynamic recrystallization was observed, resulting in a refined grain size in the strip. Implications for deformation processing of age-hardenable Al alloys into sheet form, and microstructure control therein, are discussed. 

It has been demonstrated in numerous previous studies that Android and its underlying Linux operating systems do not properly isolate mobile apps to prevent cross-app side- channel attacks. Cross-app information leakage enables malicious Android apps to infer sensitive user data (e.g., passwords), or private user information (e.g., identity or location) without requiring specific permissions. Nevertheless, no prior work has ever studied these side-channel attacks on iOS-based mobile devices. One reason is that iOS does not implement procfs— the most popular side-channel attack vector; hence the previously known attacks are not feasible. In this paper, we present the first study of OS-level side-channel attacks on iOS. Specifically, we identified several new side-channel attack vectors (i.e., iOS APIs that enable cross-app information leakage); developed machine learning frameworks (i.e., classification and pattern matching) that combine multiple attack vectors to improve the accuracy of the inference attacks; demonstrated three categories of attacks that exploit these vectors and frameworks to exfiltrate sensitive user information. We have reported our findings to Apple and proposed mitigations to the attacks. Apple has incorporated some of our suggested countermeasures into iOS 11 and MacOS High Sierra 10.13 and later versions.